Media freedom under electoral siege: money, law, and silence between the lines

(Originally published by META.MK , 13 November, 2025)

The elections have just ended, but that does not mean that politicians are not already preparing for the next ones. Macedonian citizens have been in a constant election campaign for the past two decades. During the campaign for the local elections, which seemingly ended exactly at midnight on October 31, the Macedonian media outlets, once again, for the umpteenth time, took the “maturity exam” under the scrutiny of the European Commission, the OSCE, domestic regulators, and civil society organizations. On paper, the country once again recorded “limited progress”. In practice, the media scene remained trapped between dependence on state money, an unreformed legal framework, and silent self-censorship of journalists as protection from political and economic centers of power.

“The legal framework governing the media is still not fully aligned with EU acquis, particularly the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA),” the European Commission’s 2025  report states. It adds that state advertising money during elections continues to be distributed in a non-transparent manner, “undermining competition and maintaining the media’s dependence on the government.”

Reforms on paper, status quo in practice

Although the Government has formally initiated a process to harmonize media legislation with European standards, criticisms of “partiality” and  “band-aid solutions” persist. The European Commission’s remarks echo certain domestic analyses that clearly state that the proposed and adopted amendments to the Law on Media do not address the core problems.

“The Government decided to patch up the old law instead of proposing a new, comprehensive one, even though it was drafted with the help of EU experts,” reads the assessment of the latest amendments to the Law on Media published by Metamorphosis in April 2025. It pointed out that while the introduction of a register of online media outlets could increase transparency, legal loopholes in areas such as editorial independence, concentration of ownership, and protection from surveillance create a risk of further “soft censorship.”

Even then, it was warned that state advertising continues to be used as a means of rewarding “favorable media outlets” and punishing critical ones, creating a system of silent dependence. It is this “financial loyalty,” as some media experts call it, that is becoming the government’s most powerful weapon for controlling the media landscape.

This situation is further compounded by the realities of the election cycle, which, instead of activating democratic mechanisms, often exposes the weakest points in the system. According to a shadow report  on media freedom in North Macedonia, over 10 million euros of state funds were spent on paid political advertising during the 2024 elections, which prompted an explosion of new online media outlets created precisely to enter that financial circle. This year, the amount is not as high because there were no double elections, but still, according to initial information, it is a significant amount of about 6.5 million euros. The number of online media outlets that applied for state money this year is 257, or 8 more than the 249 that applied for last year’s elections, when it was concluded that a large number of them were not even functional, or were formed specifically just to take a piece of the pie. On the other hand, until this summer, only about thirty online media outlets or portals were officially registered in the newly established AAAVMS Registry.

“Political parties use state funds to finance their campaigns, while media outlets are becoming dependent on political centers of power. This directly affects editorial policies,” the shadow report states.

Most of this money ended up with national television stations and online media outlets affiliated with major parties. The report notes that major media houses are actively lobbying to preserve the system, as they provide a significant portion of their annual revenues through it. In such a setting, “public interest journalism becomes a luxury, and political advertising–a primary source of survival.”

Will the monopoly of the “Big Four” come to an end?

The report by the Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services (AAAVMS) for the 2025 local elections further confirms the concentration of political capital in the media. Out of a total of 562 hours of paid political advertising broadcast, as much as 88 percent is divided between the four largest parties: VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DU, and VLEN.

Small parties and independent candidates were almost invisible on the airwaves, and some parliamentary parties, such as Levica (the Left) and the ZNAM Movement, could not rent space at all due to restrictions in the Electoral Code. “This means that the state pays the biggest ones to speak the loudest,” commented the media associations. Especially considering that VMRO-DPMNE found a way to finance ZNAM’s media campaign, although it is debatable how much this helped their election results, given that they won only one mayoral post, that of their leader in Kumanovo. However, it is undeniable that such a move helped the “big brother” in power. Levica, on the other hand, was legally “punished” and did not receive a single denar from the government for political advertising in the media. Similarly, it is debatable how much this affected the result considering that the parties, Levica most of all, poured substantial unregulated funds into their social media campaigns. Political advertising on these platforms, however, remains a legal puzzle, because no state institution or agency oversees it, much less regulates it.

The OSCE/ODIHR notes in its preliminary report  after the elections that “the allocation formula for paid advertising disadvantaged smaller and independent candidates,” and that state funding “blurred the line between state and party.” According to them, this practice not only distorts media coverage but also undermines public trust in the electoral process.

The problem, experts say, is not only in the money, but also in the law, which does not provide mechanisms for preventing abuse. Among other things, the amendments to the Law do not introduce any guarantees for editorial independence or protection from pressure.

“The draft law lacks explicit mechanisms to protect journalists from arbitrary interference by media owners or managers, nor does it provide legal guarantees for job security,” the document states.

The European Commission also notes that SLAPP lawsuits (lawsuits aimed at silencing critical voices) remain a serious problem, and the judiciary is not fully aware of their harmful impact. Meanwhile, the government has not introduced any mechanism to prevent them.

One example of a current SLAPP lawsuit, often intended not to seek justice but to stop or discourage journalists from investigating corruption, is the case against IRL by a businessman and former deputy prime minister, regarding an award-winning investigative story. The EU has a comprehensive new directive for such cases, which has no equivalent in the local legal framework.

“Soft censorship” as the new normal

The Commission further notes that the financial independence of the media regulator AAAVMS has improved, but the method by which the members of the AAAVMS Council are elected raises doubts about transparency and impartiality. Clear rules on the concentration of media ownership are lacking, which poses a risk to pluralism.

“The advertising market remains subject to manipulation, state advertising is distributed without sufficient transparency, undermining competition and maintaining the media’s dependence on the government. Female journalists, meanwhile, are often targeted by online harassment and gender-based violence, and institutions lack a systemic approach to protecting and supporting victims. Although amendments to the Law on Media and the introduction of a register of online media outlets were adopted in 2025, these steps still do not bring true transparency,” the EC report states.

Almost identical warnings were also made in the Shadow Report on Media Freedom  in North Macedonia prepared by the Metamorphosis Foundation and Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa, funded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, which, among other things, recommends strengthening the position of the AAAVMS regulator as an independent body, and annulling the decision to appoint members of the Council, as well as rejecting the changes that limited the regulator’s power when renewing television licenses.

The most dangerous form of pressure, according to several reports, is not outright banning, but financial and institutional silence. Editorial offices that are not “in line” with the dominant political currents are left without advertising, without state campaigns, without access to information, and without answers to their questions. This “soft censorship,” as Metamorphosis calls it, creates an atmosphere of self-censorship and gradually suppresses critical voices outside the mainstream.

Even the amendments that provide for transparency in media ownership are not enough. “There is no enforcement framework to investigate or penalize non-compliance with ownership transparency rules,” the position paper states. As a result, the public still cannot know for sure who is behind some of the media brands that shape public perception on a daily basis.

From Brussels to Rome and Skopje to Vienna, all relevant analyses send a similar message: media freedom in North Macedonia is not collapsing overnight, but is being lost gradually, through petty compromises, non-transparent finances, and institutional indifference.

In its report published the day before yesterday, the European Commission reiterates the same recommendations from last year: alignment with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), improving the independence of the public service and stepping up the fight against disinformation. In the coming year, the country should continue to review the legal framework, in particular by introducing rules on full transparency in media ownership and the allocation of public funds for state advertising, competition and state aid, and intellectual property rights. It should also implement the Public Broadcasting Service reform strategy, continue to swiftly address all threats and acts of violence against journalists, and ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice.

But, as the Metamorphosis report states, “this commitment is aspirational rather than binding.” Without concrete deadlines and political will, each subsequent report will repeat the same sentence: “Macedonia has made limited progress.”

If we also take into account challenges whose effects are yet to come–such as the role of artificial intelligence and social networks in a field where the media used to be sovereign, it seems that these challenges will only grow. At this pace, reforms to the media legal framework will increasingly move away from their goal, turning the “limited progress” into what is essentially “regression.”

This publication is the result of activities carried out within the Media Freedom Rapid Response   co-funded by the EU and within ATLIB – Transnational Advocacy for Freedom of Information in the Western Balkans, a project co-funded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. All opinions expressed represent the views of their author and not those of the co-funding institutions.

This content is part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response  (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. The project is co-funded by the European Commission.